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BIANNUAL SURVEY

his jurisdictional objection under the 1965 amendment to CPLR
3211 (e) .14

CPLR 325:

Alternate bases for renwval.

Frankel Associates, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.,10 5 was
an action originally brought in supreme court due to the monetary
limitation of the City Court of New York. Upon merger of the
city court into the newly created civil court, with its increased
monetary jurisdiction, the plaintiff applied for removal to that court.
Although the consent of the defendant was not sought, the court
held that CPLR 325 (a) or (c) permitted the removal. Even
if the defendant's consent were necessary to effect removal under
CPLR 325, the court stated that removal could nevertheless be
ordered under Article VI, § 19(a) of the New York State
Constitution.Y"
In Mather v. Ginsroe, Inc., 0 7 it was held that once a CPLR
325 removal has occurred, the transferor court under CPLR 326(b)
has no further jurisdiction over motions or applications except for
an appeal from the order of transfer. Any motion or application
other than for such appeal must be made in the transferee court.
ARTICLE 5

- VEN E

CPLR 503(c): Residence of a foreign corporation.
General Precision, Inc. v. Aretek, Inc.,10 8 involved a suit
between two foreign corporations for breach of contract. Plaintiff
laid venue in Westchester County declaring that all of its business
within the state was transacted therein. In opposition to defendant's motion to change the venue to New York County, the
plaintiff contended that even though its application for authority
named New York County as the location of the corporate office,
the corporation in fact had virtually no contact with that county
°
and thus venue belonged in Westchester County. 09
In granting
the defendant's motion, the court held that CPLR 503(c) when
04

For a thorough discussion of this problem under CPLR 3211(e) see

7B

MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3211, supp. commentary 92 (1965).
10545 Misc. 2d 607, 257 N.Y.S.2d 555 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County

1965).
106"The supreme court may transfer any action or proceeding, except
one over which it shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . to any other
court having jurisdiction of the subject matter within the judicial department provided that such other court has jurisdiction over the classes of
persons named as parties . . .'
Xo7 45 Misc. 2d 674, 257 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1965).
10845 Misc. 2d 451, 257 N.Y.S.2d 120 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County

1965).
09

Itd. at 452, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 122.
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read with BCL § 102(a) (10), required that venue be laid in
the county designated by the plaintiff in its application for authority,
as the location of its office, regardless of the quantity or quality
of the contacts plaintiff had with that county. 110
Under CPLR 503(c), a corporation is considered a resident
of the county in which its "principal office" is located. BCL
§ 102(a) (10) states that the county in which such office is located
is that stated in the foreign corporation's application for authority.
However, in the BCL the term "principal office" is not used; the
section refers merely to the "office of the corporation."
This discrepancy has led to certain misconceptions as to what
factors control the venue in an action where the plaintiff is a
corporation. The frequently asserted contention that a corporate
plaintiff is at liberty to bring an action in the county where it is
a de facto resident, although its de jure residence is elsewhere,
appears to be conclusively refuted by the ruling in the instant
case.
Of greater significance, however, is that the ruling in this
case dispels the erroneous impression, conveyed by certain recent
opinions, that the office named in the application of authority or
certificate of incorporation must be a "principal office." "1 The
decision seems to effectuate the design of the drafters of the BCL
in that they have conspicuously omitted from section 102 the
qualifying terminology found in former Section 3(16) of the
General Corporation Law."1 2
ARTICLE

10 -

PARTIEs GENERALLY

CPLR 1001(a): Motion to dismiss for nonjoinder of an
"indispensable" party.
In Blumenthal v. Allen,"'s a stockholder's derivative action,

defendant claimed that the court lacked jurisdiction over the cor0
Id. at 453, 257 N.Y.S2d at 122.
"'See Lande v. Deborah Hosp. (Sup. Ct N.Y. County), 151 N.Y.L.J.,
"1

April 20, 1964, p. 17, col. 1; Shultz v. O'Connell (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County),

150 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 8, 1963, p. 14, col. 3.

12 Compare N.Y. GEx. CORp. LAW § 3(16):
"The term 'office of a
corporation' means its principal office within the state, or principal place
of bwsiness within the state if it has no principal office therein." (Emphasis
added.), with N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 102(a) (10) : "'Office of the corporation'
means the office the location of which is stated in the certificate of incorporation of a domestic corporation or in the application of authority

of a foreign corporation .

.

.

. Such office need not be a place where

business activities are conducted by such corporation."
"'346 Misc. 2d 688, 260 N.Y.S2d 363 (Sup. Ct Nassau County 1965).
Coitra, Polar Distributors, Inc. v. Granger Realty Corp. (Sup. Ct Queens
County), 151 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 21, 1964, p. 20, col. 1.

